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Abstract: 
 
We provide a welfare based interpretation of the capital tax ambiguity result (due to Guo 
& Lansing, 1999). We show that the sign ambiguity of optimal capital tax rate in an 
imperfectly competitive economy is mainly due to the welfare cost of investment. The 
substitution and income effects of profit seeking investment reinforce each other which 
create a deadweight loss in welfare. Investors cannot perceive this effect and never invest 
at the right level. This loss is perceived only by the government which motivates capital 
taxation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Optimal taxation, Monopoly power, Ramsey policy.  
 
JEL Codes: D42, E62, H21, H30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Correspondence:  
Sheikh Selim, Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Aberconway, Colum Drive,  
Cardiff University, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom; selimsT@cardiff.ac.uk. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In this paper we present a welfare based interpretation of the Guo and Lansing’s 
(1999) capital tax ambiguity result. Guo and Lansing (1999) show that in an 
imperfectly competitive economy, in a steady state the sign of the optimal capital 
income tax is ambiguous. They argue that this ambiguity is mainly due to two effects 
that are opposite is sign: the profit effect, and the underinvestment effect. Their result 
extends Judd’s (1997) main finding that in an imperfectly competitive economy, in a 
steady state the optimal capital income tax rate is negative. We show that the main 
difference between these two approaches is the way the profit tax is modelled. Judd 
(1997) primarily assumes that profits can be taxed separately, but Guo and Lansing 
(1999) assume that any change in capital tax affects profit taxation. This assumption 
stands as the key in deriving the optimal policy that has both the motivation to tax and 
to subsidize capital. The sign of this tax rate thus depends on their relative strengths2. 
 
We show that the Guo and Lansing (1999) result can be reinterpreted from welfare 
point of view if one uses the primal approach to optimal taxation that identifies the 
welfare effect of profit seeking investment. In an imperfectly competitive economy, 
since factors earn less than the socially optimal returns, there is a general motivation 
to subsidize the returns to factors. We show that this motivation only depends on a 
single parameter that indexes the level of monopoly distortions. In a standard 
neoclassical growth model with imperfect competition, this effect is generally fixed. 
Subsidizing capital income on the basis of this effect is therefore unlikely to 
encourage investment. In essence this effect motivates a flat compensation for lost 
private returns. The capital tax ambiguity in an imperfectly competitive economy is 
mainly due to welfare cost of investment and the difference between government’s 
perception and investors’ perception about this welfare cost. This effect is analogous 
to what Guo and Lansing (1999) refers to as the profit effect, but their analysis leaves 
some room for the current interpretation to contribute. We show that since investment 
                                                 
2 Judd (1997) also says that the tax on capital was ambiguous if one did not distinguish between taxing returns on 
new investment and taxing pure profits. His paper’s main focus, however, was on the sub-optimality of a capital 
tax. In another paper, Judd (1999) argues that a tax on capital cannot be optimal since its distortions accumulate 
over time, a pattern that is inconsistent with the commodity tax principle. Later, Judd (2002) argues in favour of 
optimal capital subsidy with reference to the repealed Investment Tax Credit scheme in the US.  
 
 
in an imperfectly competitive economy is primarily motivated by earning higher 
profits, the substitution and income effect of additional investment reinforces each 
other to worsen welfare. While this effect is perceived by the government, it is not 
perceived by investors. The adverse welfare effect of investment motivates the 
government to tax capital in order to discourage profit seeking investment. Mainly 
due to this motivation, the optimal capital income tax rate is ambiguous. 
 
We argue that our interpretation is important since it distinguishes the fixed and 
variable effects that determine the steady state optimal capital income tax policy, 
which in turns assists in understanding how any change in tax code that affects 
investment decisions will affect the optimal policy in a steady state. Our analysis 
clearly shows that any change in tax code that affects investment decisions will 
change the motivation to tax capital, but will not affect the motivation to subsidize 
capital. In addition, we show that both these effects are strictly increasing in the level 
of monopoly distortions, implying that if one correctly identifies the level of 
monopoly distortions, the sign of optimal capital income tax rate remains ambiguous. 
We discuss some conditions under which this ambiguity may be resolved. We do this 
by establishing a correspondence of the optimal policy with the social cost of 
distorting taxes. 
 
 
2. Capital Income Tax and Profit Tax. 
 
Tax reforms in most industrialized countries have shown clear tendency of moving 
towards simplistic capital tax policy involving lower (or no) amount of direct subsidy 
to capital and minimum amount of deductions. Various incentive schemes including 
investment tax credits and property related tax shelters have been moderated or 
abolished in numerous countries, such as Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the USA3. In addition, several OECD countries 
have revised the allowances for depreciation of capital equipment that companies can 
use to cut down on taxable income. 
                                                 
3 Important evidence includes the 1986 repeal of Investment Tax Credit Scheme in the USA, and more recently in 
the UK, replacing the 0% starting rate of corporation profit tax and the starting marginal relief of corporation profit 
tax by a single 19% small companies’ profit tax for all companies with reported profit of £0-£300,000.   
 In addition, there is evidence of cutting down corporation tax rates with a purpose of 
increasing corporation tax revenue. The essential idea is that lower corporation tax 
rates provide lesser incentives for corporations to hide profits or to evade taxes. 
Examples of this trend include Ireland (38% to 12.5%), Australia (36% to 30%), 
Denmark (32% to 30%), France (37.8% to 35.4%), Germany (52% to 39%), Iceland 
(30% to 18%) and the Czech Republic (31% to 26%). Due to the cut in corporation 
tax rates, there has been a mixed response in the effective capital tax rates. For 
instance, this figure has increased from 18.6% to 18.7% for Ireland, from 19.2% to 
23.1% in Czech Republic, and from 22.9% to 23.6% in France. By contrast, there has 
been a decline in the effective capital tax rate in Germany (21.1% to 19.9%), while in 
Australia it has remained unchanged at 28% (OECD data). 
 
In this paper we do not intend to resolve the debate whether or not taxing/subsidizing 
capital is the right idea. The evidence we provide here says less about the exact 
relationship between profit tax rate and effective capital tax rate, but says clearly that 
providing direct subsidy to capital is something OECD countries are trying to avoid. 
We provide an interpretation of the capital tax ambiguity result based on the 
correspondence between the optimal policy in a steady state and the social cost of 
taxation. We argue that with profit and capital taxation in the scheme, a long run 
capital subsidy is optimal if capital can be taxed early and revenue can be frontloaded. 
If capital tax reforms affect profit taxation, or vice versa, subsidizing capital provides 
more than optimal returns to investors (in the form of profit subsidy). In an 
imperfectly competitive economy, a marginal increase in investment has a negative 
impact on welfare because it distorts welfare by two margins: one in terms of lost 
consumption (a substitution effect), and the other in terms of lost income from capital 
(an income effect). While the households’ intertemporal consumption and saving 
decisions do not capture this effect, the planner’s one does. The planner can perceive 
the negative impact of investment and thus will always have a motivation to 
discourage profit-seeking investment. We argue that the strength of this motivation 
will depend on the social cost of taxation, which in turns is determined by the 
government’s policy of taxing capital along the transition. 
 
 
3. The Model. 
 
We nest the two results (Guo and Lansing, 1999, and Judd, 1997) in a single 
framework. We consider a perfectly competitive final goods sector and an imperfectly 
competitive intermediate goods sector. The two technologies are: 
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where  is the level of final good,  is the level of intermediate good ,  
is working time in the final good sector, and  and  are working time and capital 
used to produce intermediate good 
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where  is the rate of return on real government bonds , and the tax rates are tR tb kt , 
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],[ 104   implies the government’s set of tax treatments [  for distributed 
corporate profits. Here 
], taxcapitalwithparattaxno
k  is the average effective tax rate on capital income, and the parameter   represents 
government’s fiscal treatment of profits. 
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Proposition 1: The first best policy involves  ktzt  11  )(  0 , 
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Proof:  Say the social planner can implement a lump sum tax equal to . The 
social planner’s problem is to choose allocations  that maximizes 
discounted lifetime utility subject to resource constraint (4d). The first order 
conditions associated with this problem are consistent with the first best allocations. 
Together with (4), the social planner’s optimum imply that one can replicate the first 
best allocations in this economy by implementing a policy that 
involves
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
 01},,,{ ttztytt knnc
 ktzt  11  )(  0 , and 0yt , which together with (4l) imply that 
.          )]1(1[  ty)1( 1   tt g
 
If profit tax was not linked to capital tax, and if profits could be taxed away each 
period, it could perform the role of a lump sum tax and capital could be subsidized at 
the first best subsidy rate. This is the main result of Judd (1997). Since we assume that 
there are no lump sum taxes or its equivalent, one needs to solve the Ramsey problem. 
We use primal approach, due to Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000, ch.12). The government 
chooses the allocation that maximizes social welfare subject to resource constraint 
(4d) and the implementability constraint: 
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and . We 
denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with (5) and (4d) by 
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respectively. We seek an allocation , and a multiplier   that 
maximize discounted lifetime utility (i.e. the social welfare) subject to (5) and (4d). 
We define the second best welfare function as
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where tkt  )( 1  is defined by (5.2). Here the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier   
measures the utility cost of raising government revenues through distorting taxes. 
Without distorting taxes, the household’s present value budget constraint (5) would 
not exert any additional constraining effect on welfare maximization beyond what is 
present in the economy’s technology, and   would be equal to zero. In contrast, 
                                                 
5 The second best level of welfare is equal to the first best level of welfare less the loss in welfare due to distorting 
taxes and after tax profits. The loss in welfare is measured in terms of the loss in allocations due to symmetric 
equilibrium reaction of taxpayers, which is multiplied by the shadow price of taxes,  . This multiplier’s value is 
representative of the amount (in terms of consumption) taxpayers are willing pay in order to replace a unit of 
distorting tax with a unit of lump sum tax.   
when the government has to use some distorting taxes, the multiplier  is strictly 
positive, and reflects the welfare cost of the distorted margins.  

 
The Ramsey equilibrium condition for  is: 1tk
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The derivatives  and )1( tVk )1( tVc  in (7) represent the marginal effects of capital 
accumulation and consumption on the second best level of welfare. Their ratio, 
therefore, is a measure of the relative effect of investment in physical capital on the 
second best level of welfare. Unlike a setting with economy-wide competitive 
markets, profits appear in the implementability constraint, implying that investment 
induces a direct effect on the second best level of welfare. This effect is not perceived 
by households. This can be verified by examining the household’s Euler equation. 
The return to investment as perceived by the households is characterized by the Euler 
equation: 
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The return to investment as perceived by the government is characterized by (7). The 
government’s perception includes the term 
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i.e. it is a measure of the relative effect of investment on the second best level of 
welfare. Notice that: 
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these effects are strictly negative, and therefore reinforce each other to reduce welfare.  
 
 
4. The Optimal Policy in a Steady State. 
 
Assume that  is separable in consumption and labour, and linear in 
labour. Consider a steady state. The optimal tax policy consistent with the steady state 
versions of (7) and (8) is represented by: 
RR 3 :u
 
c
k
k rV
V )(  1
11         (10) 
where 
  





    111111 r
c
y
u
cuuuV
c
cc
ccc )()(  





)(
)()(
)( 

1
11
1
1 ruV ck  
 
One can easily verify that  and 0cV ,0kV  which is why in a steady state the sign 
of the optimal capital tax rate is ambiguous. Our approach thus shows the underlying 
force of this ambiguity result: the welfare effect of investment. First, notice that the 
motivation to subsidize capital is simply one minus the mark up ratio, and this effect 
is completely independent of the level of investment. This motivation only depends 
on the level of monopoly distortions, and with mark up pricing this effect is always 
there. The motivation to tax capital is due to the link between profit and capital taxes, 
and if they are not linked, this motivation is no longer there6. With no imperfect 
competition,  would just be equal to zero, i.e. investors would invest at the right 
level. In the current setting,  is strictly negative, i.e. the welfare effect of 
investment in terms of the consumption good is strictly negative. This effect is not 
perceived by the investors (i.e. it is not in their Euler equation). In a steady state, the 
Ramsey policy for capital taxation is therefore determined by the relative strengths of 
these two effects. If the welfare effect (distortion effect) dominates the distortion 
effect (welfare effect), the Ramsey policy is to tax (subsidize) capital income. 
kV
kV
 
We now show that this ambiguity cannot be resolved even if one identifies the correct 
level of  . 
 
Proposition 2: Both the monopoly distortion effect and steady state welfare 
effect of investment are strictly increasing in  . The capital tax ambiguity 
cannot be resolved if the magnitude of   is identified. 
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Furthermore to proposition 1, the derivative of the distortion effect with respect to   
and the derivative of the welfare effect of investment with respect to   both are 
infinitely large in the neighbourhood of 1 , but converges to a constant in the 
neighbourhood of 0 . The magnitude of monopoly distortion that necessitates 
optimal tax (or subsidy) on capital income is therefore ambiguous.  
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and together they imply, 
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y
z . In a steady state, the Ramsey policy 
prescribes that labour income in the monopoly sector should be taxed at a lower rate 
than labour income in the competitive sector. This is a classic result of differential 
taxation in the presence of market power, proposed primarily by Stiglitz and Dasgupta 
(1971). 
 
We now return to the (steady state) optimal capital income tax policy. In particular, 
we discuss the properties of an implementable capital income subsidy. 
 
Proposition 3: An implementable capital income subsidy with 0  
overcompensates capital income at the cost of higher debt or higher labour 
income taxes. 
 
Proof:  The second term in (5.2) for t  is equal to 1 ttkt kr)()( 
  11 . 
Together with the household’s budget constraint it implies that the (after tax) effective 
real return to capital is equal to 

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
 )

1
  )(
(
)(  111 tkt r . Thus a capital subsidy 
with 0  not only pushes buyer price up to social marginal return, but also pays 
capital an extra compensation, i.e. it overcompensates capital income at the cost of 
higher debt or higher labour income taxes.         
 
Notice from (7-9) that if profits and capital are taxed at the same rate (i.e. 1 ), 
along the transition it is possible to offset the welfare effect of investment by setting 
1kt , . Given a set of initial tax rates and allocations, capital for  is 
supplied inelastically. If the government taxes it away, there will not be any welfare-
worsening investment at . What remains to be examined is how long does it take 
for the economy to reach the steady state and for how many periods the government 
1t 1t
1t
can implement a confiscating capital income tax in order to frontload revenue. 
Essentially, these depend on the parameters of the model and the set of initial 
conditions that determine the social cost of taxation. The present value of this social 
cost of distorting taxes is represented by the multiplier  . If the government can 
frontload the preset revenue by confiscating capital income in a few initial periods, 
the present value of the social cost of taxes is high. This policy will confiscate profits 
away and thus will weaken the steady state relative welfare effect of investment. This 
in turns implies that in the long run the motivation to tax capital is weaker if it is 
possible to tax capital early. 
 
For the tax code with 0 , consider a characterization of the optimal policy. Say 
utility is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure. Normalize output to one 
and set 0  in the steady state versions of (7-9), in order to derive: 
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Given the set of parameters, the restriction  implies that 1  0k . This 
restriction is a representative case where the optimal policy involves a capital income 
subsidy. The parameter   is associated with the profit ratio (see the decentralized 
equilibrium condition (4i)), and higher   implies higher profits. If the tax code 
involves no tax/subsidy on profits, and if profits are high (low), a long run capital 
income subsidy can be implemented by setting a transitional capital income tax policy 
that is associated with low (high) social cost of taxation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
In this paper we provide an alternative interpretation of the capital tax ambiguity 
result. We show analytically that the ambiguity is mainly due to the link between the 
profit tax and the capital income tax. The motivation to subsidize capital income in 
the long run is generally fixed but the motivation to tax capital income in the long run 
depends on the social cost of taxation, which in turns is determined by the 
government’s policy of capital taxation along the transition. Our interpretation 
extends the primary interpretation by Guo & Lansing (1999) in two ways. First, our 
interpretation distinguishes the fixed and the variable effect (or the welfare-
independent and welfare-dependent effect) which determine the long run policy. This 
is important since it allows one to examine how any change in tax code will affect the 
motivation to tax or subsidize capital income in the long run. Essentially, any change 
in tax code that alters the incentives to invest or consume will impute changes in the 
motivation to tax income from capital. Second, our interpretation provides the welfare 
implications of this ambiguity by relating it to the social cost of taxation. 
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